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1. The new space economy
Five decades after the success of the Apollo 11 mission, States no longer 
lead space exploration alone. The second decade of the 21st century is a time 
of acceleration where “the power of flows” vastly amplifies the power of a single 
individual, as well as the power of humans as a collective, to innovate and cre-
ate1. This immense power is being effectively harnessed by a new generation of 
space visionaries, who are set to make the 21st century an era of “space bar-
ons”2. In this context, the term “New Space” has emerged “to describe radical 
new commercial space initiatives”3 that are private sector-led and chiefly aimed 
at lowering barriers in the access to space and space-based technology, thereby 
paving the way for a “New Commercial Space” and a “New Space Economy”4.
Today’s global economy is largely dependent on space-based technology 
for day-to-day activities, to a degree of total dependency in relation to specific 
services (namely, the downstream sector). According to some estimates, the 
global space market is valued at between 250 to 350 billion US dollars, of which 
about a third corresponds to the development and manufacturing of satellites 
and launch vehicles – 56% coming from launch services and 11% from space-
based technology services (such as telecommunications and navigation)5. Cru-
cially, estimates are that by 2030 the private sector contribution to world space 
activity may vary between 35% to 40% of the total6. 
Overall, recent technological advances lowering costs of platforms and ac-
cess to space pose new legal challenges for the short-term. For example, tech-
nology currently under development has the potential of spurring a new service 
industry, allowing operators to abandon a logic of deactivation or relinquishment 
of space objects in favour of a recovery and in-orbit servicing model7. In addition, 
advances in small satellite technology hold the potential to foster the emergence 
of new business models8. Such steps in the consolidation of the new space 
economy will require the development of new domestic law in many fields, such 
as insurance law9 or banking law10.
1 Friedman (2016), p. 87.
2 davenport (2018).
3 pelton (2016), p. 2.
4 Ibid.
5 ZheleZnyakov and korablev (2017), pp. 237-238.
6 Id., p. 240. reynaud, kypraios (2019), pp. 151-153.
7 reynaud, kypraios (2019).
8 pelton (2016).
9 brünner and soucek (2011), pp. 910-948; dunk and tronchetti (2015), p. 67.
10 dunk and tronchetti (2015), pp. 874-911.
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Public policies aimed at ambitious space projects – ensuring a continuous 
human presence on the Moon, colonizing Mars, or sending missions to Sat-
urn’s moons – have been (and will increasingly have to be) balanced with other 
budgetary priorities and public perceptions. This is evident if one looks at the 
extremely high and constantly rising financial liabilities of States. Significantly, 
the total debt of governments worldwide is approximately 60 trillion US dollars, 
a considerable part of which corresponds to advanced spacefaring nations like 
the USA, China, India, the UK and France11. As societies increase their demands 
for state-led solutions to global problems – e.g., climate change – added pres-
sure will be placed on national budgets, increasing the likelihood of State and 
overall divestment in space. This gap is set to be filled by private actors, who are 
now leading the research and development in very specific sectors of the new 
space economy12. 
This tendency is already traceable. By way of illustration, in the past fifteen 
years NASA has retired the Space Shuttle and has forgone manned and cargo 
flights to the International Space Station (ISS). Significantly, the question of pri-
vatizing the ISS has been raised at the political level in the US, the rationale be-
ing to free public funding that could be redirected away from scientific research 
in-orbit and toward other projects (e.g., deep space exploration). It is no wonder 
that some authors consider that we are now in a “private astronautics”13 phase14. 
The march toward the afore-described “new space economy” spans six 
decades and can be divided in six phases15. The first two phases encompass 
(1) the mid-1950s, a period that pre-dated the launching of satellites and (2) a 
period starting in the 1960s and (3) lasting up to the 1970s when the competition 
between the USA and the USSR achieved its zenith. Then, until the mid-1980s 
the first expansion of cooperation in space took place, followed by a period 
starting in the mid-1980s and lasting until the mid-1990s when, in the wake 
of the collapse of the USSR, private actors gained increased access to launch 
capabilities. The fifth phase lasting until 2003 saw international cooperation for 
space exploration expanding significantly (the main example being the ISS pro-
ject), as private companies strengthened their role in space activities with refer-
ence to new launching capabilities and specific activities such as space tourism. 
In 2019, we are at the heart of a sixth phase that is part of the “industry 4.0”16 
11 See The Economist, The global debt clock. Available at: 
https://www.economist.com/content/global_debt_clock. Last accessed: 1/11/2019.
12 pelton (2016)
13 ZheleZnyakov and korablev (2017), p. 240.
14 reynaud, kypraios (2019), pp.151-153.
15 Id., pp. 233-236. reynaud, kypraios (2019), p. 152 at 8.
16 Ferreira, lopes and silva (2018).
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dynamics, where private sector investment in the space economy is character-
ized by long-term perspectives with return on investment perspectives spanning 
over a decade17. 
The present paper, thus, hypothesizes that private actors will advance space 
exploration and space technology, to which space resources are essential. 
Faced with this reality States will typically take three sequential steps. A simple 
first step is establishing a national legal regime to regulate space activities by 
their nationals or from their territories, thus collecting revenue and not losing out 
on the economic momentum. A second step is to develop a conducive environ-
ment to space activities in their countries, thereby growing their economies by 
way of national space strategies and public policies. Finally, as competition with 
other States will increase, a third step would be necessary to maintain advan-
tages: asserting their sovereignty by extending their jurisdictions, while at the 
same time asserting Earth-based control over private entities. This third step 
has several risks, the solution to which may only come from advancing current 
international space law.
As will be explained, the consolidation of the new space economy will entail 
a shift in paradigm: non-state actors (private entities) will be responsible for the 
highest percentage of investment in the world space economy, achieving domi-
nance in key space activities – namely, human space flight, and commercial min-
ing of space resources. The following section will focus on the second activity, 
and particularly on lunar commercial mining.
2. Commercial mining of space resources and the Moon
Mining raw materials in space was considered as a possibility for state-led 
space activities at least as far as 197918. At present time, the rationale for – chief-
ly private – investment in technologies geared toward mining raw materials in 
space as a business model is somewhat challenging. That being said, all private 
sector investment will be guided by a simple three-step process: 1) identifying 
a recoverable resource; 2) developing the technology necessary to recover the 
resource; and 3) a client. On the one hand, there are predictions regarding dif-
ficulties in accessing and the depletion of certain raw materials on Earth19, as 
17 ZheleZnyakov and korablev (2017), p. 232.
18 “Owing to mounting interest on Capitol Hill, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
looked closely at this issue in 1979 and determined that «space colonization, once a field of visionaries and 
science fiction writers, now attracts scientists, who advocate the mining of the moon and asteroids for raw 
materials.»” – Spiller (2015), p. 183. See also Tronchetti (2009); Lee (2012).
19 meinert et al. (2016). 
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the development of the so-called green economy in the context of Industry 4.0 
largely depends upon access to so-called critical raw materials20. Herein may 
reside a possible rationale, given that at present time a single State concentrates 
70% of the supply side of the critical raw materials identified by the EU21. On the 
other hand, it seems improbable that commercial mining of space resources 
can be part of an economic model resting solely on Earth-based applications. 
Although according to some estimates an average asteroid may be worth 200 
billion US dollars22 and NASA has a mission – named Psyche – to study an as-
teroid valued in the quadrillions23, commercial mining of space resources as a 
space activity will require a value chain geared for space exploration and future 
space colonization. 
Interestingly, the technology enabling the identification and the analysis 
of near-Earth objects (NEO)24 is already in existence: in late 2018 a success-
ful Japanese Space Agency (JAXA) mission proved the possibility of landing a 
man-made platform on an asteroid25. Nonetheless, the two private companies 
developing projects geared toward asteroid mining – Planetary Resources and 
Deep Space Industries – have ceased their activities.
Therefore, even though an argument could be made regarding the economic 
and technological viability of capturing and bringing a NEO closer to Earth orbit, 
the fact of the matter is that commercial mining of space resources will be fea-
sible in the medium-term if the focus is on the celestial body that is nearest to 
Earth: the Moon. 
The rationale of aiming for the Moon goes well beyond the closer distance: it 
is essential for the feasibility of the most ambitious space exploration projects – 
namely, Mars. Although there are projects with the aim of achieving a permanent 
human presence on the Moon, the main interest in connection with space min-
ing is space resource utilization (SRU) with the objective of transforming proven 
lunar resources in space, thereby reducing costs and enabling new types of 
space activities. In other words, commercial mining on the Moon would be most 
viable if a value chain could be created whereby mined lunar resources could be, 
for example, transformed into spacecraft fuel. Here the discussion in scientific 
forums normally turns to the existence of water on the Moon, an assumption 
that still has some uncertainties. Other uses of the Moon encompass very rare 
and peculiar regions on the lunar surface such as the Peaks of Eternal Light 
20 World Bank (2017).
21 EU (2017).
22 Jakhu, pelton and nyampong (2016), p. 4.
23 Forbes (2017).
24 Jakhu, pelton and nyampong (2016), p. 4.
25 JAXA (2018).
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(PEL), so called because they are permanently exposed to sunlight – thus, with 
obvious potential for producing energy with photovoltaic technology. 
Complexity is, thus, present in a way reminiscent of the old chicken and 
the egg adage: can a technology be developed without ascertaining before-
hand what the resource’s extraction demands are? If answering this question 
is difficult, it is certain that, for the State, there is little rationale to invest in such 
endeavours.
Further to the technological capabilities, achieving the goal of returning to 
the Moon requires a legal framework to be in place that articulates current in-
ternational space law with state-level legal regimes directed at licensing space 
activities. If, as we posit, the State is set to become an enabler of commercial 
mining of space resources and related activities, then two paths are possible: 
a) States lead efforts at international level to develop current space law, possi-
bly toward a specifically crafted non-legally binding instrument; b) States act in 
self-interest eschewing international cooperation in favour of the enactment of 
national space legislation that – coupled with mining industry standards – will 
lead to a contested legal environment where non-state actors will compete. As 
we will demonstrate below, there is the risk of the Moon becoming like the 16th 
century’s high seas, ushering in an era of resource competition among 21st cen-
tury privateers26.
3. Space resource exploitation: between lex lata and de lege 
ferenda
The origins and development of international space law can be traced to 
the launch of the first satellite in 1957, thereby making this field of international 
law somewhat a product of the geopolitical circumstances of that time. The 
work of the United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Use of Outer Space 
(UN COPUOS) during the 1960s would eventually culminate in the core interna-
tional law instruments that form the Corpus Iuris Spatialis27 to date: starting in 
1967 and over a period of twelve years, five major space law instruments were 
26 reynaud, kypraios (2019), p. 167.
27 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (10 October 1967); Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects (09 October 1973); Convention on Registration of Objects Launched 
into Outer Space (15 September 1976); Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (27 October 
1986); Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency (26 Febru-
ary 1987); Principles on the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Space (A/RES/47/68, 14 December 1992). 
In addition, the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union (1992) and the Treaty Banning 
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963).
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created. In this light, space law is exceptional as a field of international law, given 
that its creation and development pre-date the emergence of a complex set of 
legal questions. In this regard space law is in stark contrast with other fields of 
international law such as the Law of the Sea, the codifying efforts of which cul-
minated only in 1982.
At this point, another aspect referring to the development of international law 
in toto is of relevance. During the past thirty years, the crafting of legally binding 
international instruments has progressively given way to a preference for non-le-
gally binding instruments. This general trend was mirrored in the development 
of international law on outer space. After the adoption of the five international 
space law treaties between 1967 and 1979, during the 1980s the progression 
of space law at the global level was marked by the adoption of principles es-
tablished in UN General Assembly Resolutions28. More recently, States have be-
come even more reliant on non-legally binding instruments, as space law has 
been advanced by means of recommendations and guidelines29 – an example of 
which are the UN COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of 200730.
Coming to the more specific issue of whether commercial mining of space 
resources is an activity compatible with existing international space law, there 
are different questions debated among authors and in scholarly writings31. A first 
point of contention pertains to ascertaining whether mining space resources – 
legally equivalent to their exploitation or use – is prohibited by the principle of 
non-appropriation enshrined in Article II of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 read 
together with Article I thereof. Briefly, whereas Article I of OST 1967 establishes 
that outer space, the Moon and other celestial bodies “shall be free for explora-
tion and use by all States”, Article II thereof explicitly foresees that “outer space, 
including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appro-
priation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other 
means”. Hence, if one equates exploitation with appropriation, an argument may 
be made that commercial mining of space resources is not possible under cur-
rent international space law.
28 Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television 
Broadcasting, UNGA Resolution 37/92, 10 December 1982, UN Doc. A/AC.105/572/Rev.1, para. 39; Prin-
ciples Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, UNGA Resolution 41/65, 3 December 
1986, UN Doc. A/AC.105/572/Rev.1, para. 43; Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in 
Outer Space, UNGA Resolution 47/68, 14 December 1992, UN Doc. A/AC.105/572/Rev.1, para. 47; Dec-
laration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the 
Interest of all States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, UN Doc. 51/122, 
13 December 1996.
29 UN (2017), § 35.
30 UN (2007), § 26.
31 Jakhu, pelton and nyampong (2016). reynaud, kypraios (2019), pp. 155-156.
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The abovementioned issue of appropriation certainly warrants a more de-
tailed discussion. As a matter of fact, this question was raised in connection with 
the collection of lunar rock samples (subsequently broken-down and offered to 
other States) by US astronauts in the framework of the Apollo missions32. In this 
regard, the most balanced legal understanding is favourable to separating what 
are two different questions: a) appropriating celestial bodies; b) appropriating 
resources existing in celestial bodies (such as lunar regolith) – the latter not being 
clearly prohibited by the Corpus Iuris Spatialis. This is also the understanding of 
the International Institute for Space Law (IISL) position paper of 2015, which sets 
forth that “the use of space resources is permitted” absent a clear prohibition in 
the OST 196733.
A second point of contention pertains specifically to mining space resources 
on the Moon, with the vexata questio among space authors here concerning the 
concept of common heritage of mankind34. Interestingly, the concept of “com-
mon heritage of mankind” enshrined in Article 11(1) of the Moon Agreement is 
often blurred with the notion of “province of all mankind” (Article I, OST 1967). 
Arguably, the essence for both the concept of common heritage of mankind and 
that of province of all mankind lies in the common interest of mankind stated in 
the Preamble of the OST. In fact, the common interest of mankind in outer space 
had already been recognized prior to the OST 1967 in historic UNGA Resolu-
tions – namely, Resolution 1348(XIII) of 13 December 1958, Resolution 1472(XIV) 
of 12 December 1959, Resolution 1721(XVI) of 20 December 1961, Resolution 
1962(XVIII) of 13 December 1963. Most recently, a reference can be found in 
UNGA Resolution 55/122 of 27 February 2001.
There are those space law scholars that consider the two concepts dis-
tinguishable from each other. Largely, the province of all mankind concept is 
considered as not establishing any State obligation to share the benefits derived 
from outer space activities, while the common heritage of mankind concept is 
seen as indicating that the exploration and exploitation of a certain space (or 
area) and its resources shall be carried out in accordance with the rules estab-
lished by an international regime or authority.
On the one hand, Article 11(1) of the Moon Agreement establishes that “the 
moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind”, while on 
the other hand the preamble of the OST 1967 refers to “the common interest of 
all mankind”35. On the other hand, attention should be given to Article 6(2) of the 
32 ogunbanwo (1975), p. 212. 
33 IISL (2015), p. 3.
34 Further on the relationship and implications of the two concepts for commercial activities in outer 
space, see gabrynowicZ (1992), p. 691. reynaud, kypraios (2019), pp. 155-156.
35 Lee (2012), pp. 203-272. See also Jakhu, pelton and nyampong (2016). 
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Moon Agreement, as it may be construed as allowing prospecting of resources 
on the Moon. Moreover, Article 11 in its entirety – its number 2 is similar in terms 
to Article II, OST 1967 – can be said to not be completely closed regarding the 
exploitation of lunar resources, given that it points to the establishment of “an in-
ternational regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation 
of the natural resources of the Moon”36. Further to both issues, one circumstance 
conditions the strength of the Moon Agreement: its low ratification rate37. Thus, 
one difficulty to the development on a non-legally binding instrument specifically 
tailored to space mining on the Moon is that States are divided in two groups 
with different – albeit not completely opposing – views. Crucially, the group of 
States that have ratified the Moon Agreement does not include spacefaring na-
tions with a demonstrated strategic interest on the Moon – namely the USA and 
the People’s Republic of China.
Against this background, it is certainly worth noting that there is an increas-
ing number of States – specifically within UN COPUOS – who have indeed ex-
pressed themselves in favour of the creation of an international legal regime 
aiming to regulate commercial space activities38. In assessing the issue of com-
patibility of commercial space mining with current international space law, two 
main arguments exist. Firstly, that the rationale of the regime of OST 1967 ap-
pears somewhat incompatible with a future where state-enabled private actors 
would be the sole competitors for resources on the Moon and other celestial 
bodies. Secondly, the argument may certainly be made that space mining as 
a purely commercial activity is irreconcilable with the concept of common her-
itage of mankind. Both arguments have historically been shared among States 
opposing a more flexible interpretation of current international space law by the 
spacefaring nations39. 
Diverging somewhat from the debate among space law authors, States have 
furthered the debate in relation to the two points of contention in a more deter-
mined way. The UN COPUOUS Legal Subcommittee report for the fifty-sixth 
session (2017) registers a concern in connection with attempts by some States 
36 See Moon Agreement, Article 11(5).
37 The Moon Agreement has eighteen States Parties – namely, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Chile, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi 
Arabia, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela – and four Signatory States – namely, France, Guatemala, India and 
Romania. See https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXIV-2&chapter=24&-
clang=_en#2. Importantly, out of these eighteen States that are parties to the treaty, seven have enacted 
national space laws (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Kazakhstan, Netherlands and Philippines), similar to 
France which is among the four States that have signed but not ratified it – see, http://www.unoosa.org/
oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/nationalspacelaw/index.html. Last accessed: 30/10/2019.
38 UN (2018), § 246.
39 Jakhu and dempsey (2017), p. 21; UN (2017), para. 29. reynaud, kypraios (2019), p. 157.
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of circumventing the obligations stemming from the OST 1967, either by legiti-
mizing legally controversial space resource exploitation activities undertaken by 
national non-state actors, or by creating “a register or a flag of convenience 
for private commercial entities interested in pursuing the exploitation of space 
resources”40. Furthermore, the 2017 report conveys the consensus among 
States regarding the shared understanding that article II OST 1967 prohibits 
any appropriation of the Moon or any celestial body, while registering a concern 
with the fact that some States have approved national space legislation in view 
of protecting private property rights over space resources mined from celestial 
bodies – maxime tantamount to a “claim of sovereignty or national appropria-
tion”41. Nonetheless, the consensus seemed to emerge that all activities pursued 
orderly and non-abusively “and undertaken with the purpose of exploration of 
space […] should be considered for the benefit and in the general interest of all 
countries”42.
In different terms, the UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee fifty-seventh ses-
sion report (2018)43 registers the openness by a majority of States to the possi-
bility of undertaking discussions regarding a legal framework applicable to the 
exploitation and/or utilization of space resources by non-state/private actors44. 
Crucially, specific calls were made for a multilateral approach to “detailed discus-
sions on the exploitation and utilization of space resources by private entities” 45 
in order to address very specific concerns stemming from the increased private 
sector engagement in space activities. 
In the same vein, the UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee report of 201946 
corroborates this shift in state practice. Most interestingly, the consensus seems 
to exist on the acceptance of non-state/private actor engagement in space re-
source exploration and/or exploitation, with the main point of contention being 
the need for a new international legal framework47. Significantly, some States 
held the view that “commercial utilization” was consistent with current interna-
tional space law, as the OST 1967 “did not broadly preclude such activities”48, 
while other States espoused the creation of an “ownership regime” for non/
40 brünner and soucek (2011), p 246. See also drobnig et al. (1990); carlisle (1981); United States. 
Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Special Oversight Panel on the Merchant Marine (2003).
41 UN (2017), §§ 240-241.
42 Id., § 242.
43 UN (2018), § 246.
44 Id., §§ 244-265.
45 Id., §§ 244-245.
46 UN (2019).
47 Id., §§ 242-248, 263.
48 Id., § 245.
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renewable space resources49. Additionally, a majority of States expressed fa-
vourable views to enhancing the Legal Subcommittee’s work regarding explo-
ration, exploitation and utilization of space resources50. Although different views 
were indeed set forth, States no longer shared the interrogations and hesitations 
regarding the commercialization of space resources registered in 2017. Pursu-
ant to the unlocking of the debate in 2018, the discussions at the UN COPUOS 
Legal Subcommittee were re-centred to on the future perspectives for the de-
velopment of international space law, clearly encompassing space resource uti-
lization and exploitation for commercial purposes. 
Hence, the following conclusion may be drawn: what remains a vexata ques-
tio among authors is understood by the States no longer as a question of com-
patibility but as a question of articulation with current international space law. 
4. What role for National Space Legislation?51
Although the legality of commercial mining of space resources can be said 
to have ceased to be a point of legal contention between States at the UN level, 
current international law on outer space only provides part of the legal framework 
required to engage in this space activity. In essence, Article VI of the OST 1967 
provides that the “activities of non-governmental entities in outer space […] shall 
require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party 
to the Treaty”. Accordingly, national space legislation should emerge as a nat-
ural occurrence from the international law regime – specifically, the obligations 
enshrined in the OST 1967 – thus representing the continuity, the realization and 
the completion of the Corpus Iuris Spatialis52.
The enactment of national space legislation provides completion at the do-
mestic level for the obligations imposed upon States by international legal instru-
ments, thereby an interpretation. In addition, national space legislation has the 
potential of reflecting the changes the space sector is currently undergoing as 
the new space economy takes shape.
The number of States that have enacted national space legislation is trend-
ing upwards. Five decades ago, there were only two States – Norway53 and 
the USA – whose domestic legal order contained national space legislation. 
49 Id., § 247.
50 Id., §§ 259-266.
51 This part follows very closely and develops an analysis previously undertaken by the authors. See 
reynaud, kypraios (2019), pp. 159-163.
52 dunk (2011); Froehlich (2018).
53 See Act on Launching Objects from Norwegian Territory in Outer Space (Act n. 38 of 13 June 1969).
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Surprisingly, until the end of 2000 only an additional four States had enacted 
national legislation regarding space matters: – namely, Sweden (1982), the UK 
(1986), South Africa (1993) and Australia (1998)54. Then this number increased 
starting in 2005-2008, and again recently in the past four years55. In 2019, Por-
tugal became one of the latest countries to enact a complete national space 
legal regime, consisting of a national space law and the respective regulatory 
regime56.
When considering the enactment of national space legislation, there is guid-
ance that may be resorted to such as the Sofia Guidelines for a Model Law on 
National Space Legislation57, or the Recommendations part of UNGA Resolution 
68/74 of 11 December 201358. However, a previous choice must be made be-
tween two possible legislative outcomes, as the national space legislation either 
becomes (a) the sum of all national legislation with an impact for space activities, 
or (b) a legal instrument that chiefly defines the existing rights and obligations 
regarding space activities carried out in a particular State or elsewhere by its 
nationals.
In wider terms, the potential is there for very interesting complementarities 
between the international law regime and domestic law59. A first objective for 
national space legislation is to create a national legal framework for the orderly 
development of space activities, thereby fulfilling an obligation for all State Par-
ties stemming indirectly from the wording of Article VI OST 1967. A second goal 
will be the definition of the administrative competences in relation to the engage-
ment in space activities by private actors, affording them an appropriate degree 
of legal certainty and protection. Lastly, a decisive goal relates to the potential of 
national space legislation to complete the international law regime itself. 
54 UK: Outer Space Act (1986); Sweden: Lag (1982:963) om rymdverksamhet (1982); South Africa: 
Space Affairs Act (Statutes of the Republic of South Africa – Trade and Industry No. 84 of 1993) (1993); 
Australia: Space Activities Act No.123 (1998).
55 Belgium: Loi du 17 septembre 2005 relative aux activités de lancement, d’opération de vol ou de 
guidage d’objets spatiaux (2005); France: Loi n° 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux opérations spatiales 
(2008); USA: U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Space Resource Exploration and Utili-
zation Act of 2015 (2015); and American Space Commerce Free Enterprise Act of 2018 (2018); New Zea-
land: Outer Space and High-altitude Activities Act of 2017 (2017); UK: Space Industry Act of 2018 (2018); 
Luxembourg: Loi du 20 juillet 2017 sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace (2017). 
56 Decree-Law no. 16/2019 of 22 January, published in the Official Journal of the Portuguese Republic, 
1st series, no. 15 of 22 January 2019. This legislation is completed by the Regulation no. 697/2019 regard-
ing the Access to and Engagement in Space Activities published in the Official Journal of the Portuguese 
Republic, 2nd series, no. 170 of 5 September 2019.
57 ILA (2012); UN (2013a).
58 UN (2013b).
59 dunk (2011); Froehlich (2018).
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In this regard, two legal questions should be referenced. A first question 
relates to the limits to State sovereignty over airspace, as the definition and 
delimitation of outer space is in itself a vexata questio60. On the one hand, the 
“spatialist”61 doctrine is favourable to a clear delimitation of a frontier between 
airspace and outer space62. On the other hand, the so-called “functionalist”63 
doctrine assumes such task as nearly impossible and devalues the usefulness 
of establishing a delimitation, while questioning the existence of a scientific basis 
to define a natural vertical limit64. Some States try to answer the delimitation 
question in their respective national space legislation by choosing to vertically 
limit state jurisdiction. By way of illustration, Denmark’s space legislation of 2016 
defines as “outer space” the “space above the altitude of 100 km above sea 
level”65. In other terms, the Portuguese space legislation adopts a functional 
approach to the question, as no specific definition was introduced66.
A second question refers to enshrining in national law the obligation to 
register space objects foreseen in the Convention on Registration of Objects 
Launched into Outer Space (14 January 1975)67. A main aspect is that Article II 
of the Convention on Registration does not establish a deadline for the fulfilment 
of the obligation to register an object, whereas Article IV thereof asserts that 
States have a duty to inform the UN Secretary-General “as soon as practicable”. 
Again, as an example the Danish space legislation establishes that final informa-
tion regarding registration must be reported within a month after the object has 
been launched68, whereas the Portuguese law establishes a two-day deadline 
following the launch of the space object69.  
Taking into consideration the complexities associated with space activi-
ties, an argument may be made that all national space legislation contributes to 
mitigating the specific risks for the State resulting from private entities’ actions 
(recalling Article VI OST 1967). Moreover, Article VIII of OST 1967 seems to en-
shrine an obligation of continuous supervision vis-à-vis the space object by the 
60 neto (2015).
61 Id., p. 32.
62 Id., pp. 41-59.
63 Id., p. 32.
64 Id., pp. 32-34.
65 Part 2, 4, n.º 4, Outer Space Act., Act no. 409 of 11 May 2016. Available at: https://ufm.dk/en/legis-
lation/prevailing-laws-and-regulations/outer-space. Last accessed: 25/09/2019.
66 See Article 2 of Decree-Law no. 16/2019 of 22 January 2019.
67 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 14 January 1975, 1023 UNTS 15.
68 See Part 5, no. 9, 2, Executive Order no. 552 of 31 May 2016 on requirements in connection with 
approval of activities in outer space.
69 See Article 16(5) of Decree-Law no. 16/2019 of 22 January 2019.
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registration State. Hence, the State where the space object is registered retains 
the jurisdiction and the control, an issue that gains relevance considering the pri-
vate sector’s dynamic – for example in cases where a space object is alienated 
to another company seated in another State.
Overall, national space legislation has the potential to be itself used as a 
stimulus for space activities. A State’s space legislation establishing less-de-
manding requirements for the licensing of space activities can admissibly func-
tion as a powerful attraction for private entities, similar to a State’s tax system. 
In time, this circumstance may conceivably lead to a highly competitive environ-
ment in the field of commercial mining of space resources. 
5. Conclusions: preventing or enabling 21st century 
privateers?70
In the late 15th century, at a time when the world was divided in half by the 
Treaty of Alcáçovas (1479) and the Treaty of Tordesilhas (1494), the Papacy 
acted as the legitimizer of conquests and occupations. Disputes arising from 
the competition among colonizing powers for conquered territories were settled 
by the award of legal occupation titles, such as Pope Alexander VI’s Bula Inter 
Caetera of 1493. From this practice the international custom of effective occu-
pation would be born, a concept that in private law terms approximates that of 
possession.
In legal terms, States may be said to have a choice between expanding 
national legislation or advancing international law for outer space. Although the-
oretically these are not mutually excluding choices, they may not be the only two 
actual choices facing the State.
As the new space economy consolidates in the framework of Industry 4.0 
dynamics, States will be required to retool their societies to stay competitive. The 
option to compete to attract private space companies in order to enhance their 
economies has already been taken by several countries, proof of which are the 
numbers relating to the enactment of national space legislation. 
Problems are set to emerge as States take the next logical step: maintain-
ing their competitive edge. Regarding outer space and the Moon, there is no 
Papacy or an international law regime such as the UNCLOS providing for a de 
minimis international legal framework for private entities’ commercial activities 
like the commercial mining of space resources. Therefore, there is a legal margin 
for states to seek ways to remain competitive. 
70 This part follows very closely and expands the conclusions previously rehearsed by the authors. See, 
reynaud, kypraios (2019), pp. 165-167.
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The State could then reinvent itself for the new space economy. As national 
space legislation is enacted enshrining different configurations, private entities 
will have a choice between different regulatory regimes. This is perhaps the main 
reason why some States at the UN COPUOS Legal Subcommittee warn against 
a first come, first served economic model in commercial mining of space re-
sources71. Alternatively, a “flags of convenience” scenario may be envisaged, 
characterized by private entities being registered in States foreseeing the lowest 
regulatory requirements – thus, allowing for overall lower operational costs by 
comparison. 
As explained above, besides the option of varying the regulatory burden in 
their respective national space legislations, States are already in effect compet-
ing by extending the limits of their national jurisdiction over space activities in a 
very specific way – that is, by inserting possession-related provisions regarding 
space resources. This could conceivably be taken to the next level as national 
space legislation begins equating space mining of a celestial body for commer-
cial purposes to a licensable private space activity under domestic law.
In other words, the potential for disruption will stem from: a) the divergence 
between national space legislation regarding the definition of the obligations and 
the responsibilities of private entities; b) differences regarding administrative or 
regulatory powers at the State level in connection with the licensing of space 
activities; and c) States extending their national jurisdictions further by consid-
ering space mining as a proper space activity that may be subject to a national 
licensing mechanism. Absent consensual advances at the international level, 
assertions of national sovereignty have the risk of conceivably pushing reality 
beyond the aforementioned “flags of convenience” scenario typical of the mar-
itime shipping industry: that is, the Moon and near-Earth orbit could become a 
contested space where State-enabled 21st century privateers will compete for 
resources and celestial body possessions. New types of services may then rap-
idly emerge destined to deliver the security the State will not be there to provide 
– namely, private military space companies.
As explained above, a few space law scholars have proposed detailed 
frameworks aimed at addressing this problem. Regarding legal developments 
concerning the return to the Moon, some authors propose that inspiration may 
be sought in the Law of the Sea72. In our view, an essential step may perhaps be 
to harness existing data relating to the Moon surface’s features with the objective 
of then crafting new legal concepts out of lunar morphological features, all in 
71 UN (2017), § 50.
72 tronchetti (2009).
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similar terms as geomorphological concepts were made part of the Law of the 
Sea in the UNCLOS 1982. 
Perhaps the most added value would come from advancing an international 
legal framework specifically crafted for commercial lunar resource exploitation 
in the form of a non-legally binding instrument that could be scalable, coupled 
with an international licensing mechanism similar to those of Earth-based mining 
industry – thus having the merit of further spurring innovation by private entities 
– where, for example, temporary licenses could be issued. 
Given that international space law is not static, the challenge lies in as-
certaining what norms need reinterpretation and what issues require new le-
gal frameworks. The risk of fragmentation is high, mainly due to the possibility 
that different legal interpretations of international law principles and concepts 
are given in national space legislation. Thus, the relationship between interna-
tional space law and national space legislation needs to be considered: will the 
solutions for the new questions pertaining to the commercialization of space be 
sought at the international level or at the State level? If sought at the interna-
tional level, will primacy be given to international legal instruments or non-legally 
binding instruments? Finally, will the solutions ever be successfully articulated 
with existing international space law – chiefly with the principles enshrined in 
OST 1967 – and to a degree that is acceptable to a wide majority of States? In 
seeking to provide elements to answer these questions, there are at least two 
dichotomies to consider. On the one hand, there is the opposition between the 
national level – a domestic law perspective, geared toward national policy objec-
tives – and the international level – an international law perspective, sensitive to 
the aspirations of the international community. On the other hand, the ambition 
of reviving the Corpus Iuris Spatialis is opposed to state-level legislative action 
resulting in a gentle weakening of international law.
Specifically considering commercial mining of lunar resources, the concept 
of common heritage of mankind needs to be recalled. One of the challenges 
that should be addressed by a future legal regime on space resources utilization 
by means of space mining relates to the protection of so-called “lunar heritage 
sites” – e.g. the wreckage of the Soviet “Luna 2” spacecraft in Mare Serenitatis 
and the US Lunar Module “Eagle” used in Apollo 11 located in Mare Tranquil-
itatis, as well as artefacts or equipment such as the human boot prints left on 
the Moon by US astronauts during the Apollo missions – from the harmful effect 
of in situ private mining activities. Indeed, there have been proposals to extend 
the designations and protections of the UN World Heritage sites to historic lunar 
locations that represent significant advances in humankind’s space exploration. 
In our context, this relates to very likely future scenarios in which the landing of 
platforms on the Moon, or the actual mining of its surface, by private entities 
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would result in havoc on those sites; as it is the case with the 1969 catastrophi- 
cal sandblasting of Surveyor III (that had landed on the Moon two years earlier) 
by Apollo 12’s lunar lander, future commercial lunar missions may in fact damage 
such historically significant landing sites. This risk becomes even higher when 
combined with a probable high competition of private entities for prime locations 
to undertake their mining activities – many of which lie on the same areas where 
the early lunar expeditions took place.
By contrast with the Law of the Sea, international space law had the excep-
tional merit of by and large anticipating the full materialization of the reality it was 
made to discipline. At a time when innovation is propelled by an acceleration of 
flows at a global scale, the reassertion of control by the State may materialize in 
it assuming a central role as legitimizer and guarantor of private engagement in 
the new space economy. 
As national sovereignty is asserted at the expense of common heritage of 
mankind, the choice to embark on complex legal discussions at the UN level is 
increasingly unenticing. In such a scenario, the international cooperation of the 
past may wither in favour of mere coordination in forums uncovered by inter-
national legal instruments with a view of agreeing new rules for the new space 
economy. In this light, the creation of a forum for space matters not covered by 
an international treaty assembling the USA, China, the Russian Federation, India 
– four countries with proven anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon capability – and France 
(a sort of G5 for Space), is a development that is increasingly less unimaginable.
By eschewing international cooperation toward developing current space 
law, and instead choosing to develop national space legislation and collect rev-
enue, States will contribute to the reinvention of their role: from leaders into 
enablers, potentially ushering in an era of 21st century privateers.
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